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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Submission of NSSM 1/41

Attached is a study of the Implications for U. S. Policy of the Participation of the People's Republic of China in Multilateral Diplomacy undertaken pursuant to NSSM 141.

Samuel De Palma
Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization
Affairs, and Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Working Group

Attachment:

Study pursuant to NSSM 141

Declassified/Released on 10 17 17 15 under provisions of E.O. 12958

y J. Saunders, National Security Council

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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

A Study Pursuant to National Security Study Memorandum 141







### Table of Contents

Introduction: PRC and U.S. Objectives and Attitudes					
The	Prol	olem	s and Opportunities		
	I.	0n	-Going Negotiations		
		A.	Arms Limitation	6	
		В.	Ocean Problems	10	
		C.	Peacekeeping	14	
		D.	Outer Space	16	
	II. Political Issues				
		A.	Korea	19	
		В.	Middie East	22	
		C.	India-Pakistan	23	
		D.	Southern Africa	26	
		E.	Taiwan	27	
		F.	Viet-Nam	29	
		G.	Cambodia	30	
		Н.	Micronesia	31	
		I.	Specialized Agencies	32	





			Page	
III.	II. Economic and Social Issues			
	Α.	Environment	34	
	В.	Drug Control	35	
	C.	Other Economic and Social Questions	36	
	D.	Red Cross Conference	39	
IV.	Ins	titutional Arrangements		
	Α.	PRC and ROC Adherence to Conventions	41	
	В.	UN Finances	46	
	c.	Secretary General	48	
	D.	PRC Personnel in UN and Specialized Agencies	49	





### PRC and US Objectives and Attitudes


#### Introduction

The PRC will combine three elements in its multilateral diplomacy. It will make common cause with the less developed world and attempt to marshal sentiment against "superpower domination" and "collusion". Yet, since the PRC is in fact a big power with interests that differ from those of the small countries, it will in some cases act pragmatically and take stands that substitute ideology to practical interest. Finally, sooner or later the PRC will, like everyone else, find it necessary to engage in some logrolling in order to accomplish its objectives. We expect the first of the elements will be the most prominent for some time.

The combination of Third World leadership aspirations with pragmatism is the essence of the Chou line which emerged victorious after the Cultural Revolution. It would take a major internal change in China to alter those essentials of PRC policy.

The PRC's immediate political objective will be to make sure that the ROC does not remain in any UN-related organizations or participate in international conferences. It will press for international recognition that Taiwan is an integral part of China and will insist that the ROC cannot take part in international organizations or conferences under any name. At the same time, there may be a wide range of organizations and conferences in which it will choose not to participate actively. These may include for the foreseeable future the international financial institutions.

Although it may hold back until it can appraise the results of the President's visit, we can anticipate a major PRC effort to isolate the US on the Taiwan question within the UN and possibly gain UNGA approval for a resolution recommending the end of the US "occupation" of Taiwan.



It is apparent that the PRC is not yet familiar enough with the issues and tactical problems to engage itself actively on all subjects before the UN and in international conferences. It will therefore enter multilateral diplomacy slowly, sending representatives to selected agencies and onferences where it sees clear opportunities to pose as the friend of the weak against the strong, or to achieve specific national interest objectives. Examples include the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and conferences on the environment and law of the sea. The PRC may refuse to participate in organizations or conferences in which participation would tend to compromise its non-superpower image or would conflict with already announced PRC policy: e.g. disarmament conferences limited to militarily significant countries.

Given its desire to become the leader of the 'Third World" and its antagonistic posture vis-a-vis the US, USSR and Japan, the PRC will be especially radical on colonial and economic development issues, placing ideology and propaganda ahead of practicability. Similarly, it will press for radical disarmament measures, both to embarrass the US and USSR and, when necessary, to protect itself against lesser measures which would interfere with its own nuclear aspirations (much as the French have done). In a number of cases, we can expect that disagreements between the PRC and the USSR may impede progress toward desired goals (e.g. disarmament) or may add more heat to already difficult situations (e.g. Southern Africa). This will add to our difficulties, but in some cases it could also afford us opportunities since common-sense solutions offered by us will contrast better with unworkable, propagandistic Communist proposals.

Yet in the long run, to succeed in the leadership role it seems to be intent on asserting, Peking will have to demonstrate that multilateral diplomacy can, with PRC participation, produce results and reach



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agreements more satisfactory to the Afro-Asian states than those reached prior to PRC entry into the UN. Therefore, although we anticipate that PRC statements will continue to reflect a sharp tone whenever there is a tempting ideological target, the need to achieve results should eventually force the PRC to adopt more pragmatic bargaining positions and become more willing to reach compromise settlements, especially when such settlements are acceptable to the Third World.

We do not know to what extent the PRC intends to use international forums for negotiation of Asian problems. In this paper we discuss only the problems and opportunities in connection with possible UN discussions of the Korea and Taiwan issues, and more briefly Viet-Nam and Cambodia. PRC attitudes toward Japan will also be a problem for us in the multilateral context, but are not discussed here. It must be noted, however, that the entry of the PRC into the UN makes the Japanese goal of a permanent seat on the Security Council more difficult to attain.

What we ourselves do in the UN and related international bodies should be designed in general to:

- -- facilitate an early and active participation by the PRC in a wide variety of UN activities where its presence is inevitable or where a basis for cooperation with it exists;
- -- discourage the PRC from looking at these institutions from a purely political and propaganda point of view and try to engage it in substantive discussions of mutual advantage;



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-- preserve a place for the ROC on the international scene, at least as a party to economic arrangements.\*

Peking's participation in the UN offers some potential opportunities to further US policy objectives. While at first Peking is likely to crowd the Soviets toward more radical positions, the PRC may also in some cases tend to push the Soviets closer to positions taken by other major powers. For example, if Peking should endorse the more radical Arab positions on the issue of a Middle Eastern settlement the Soviets may find it advisable to work for more realistic solutions in keeping with the mainstream of Arab policy.

In the field of arms control, even though its initial contribution is likely to be largely propagandistic, the participation of the PRC could lead to its engagement in mutually advantageous arrangements, for instance on non-proliferation.

Peking's participation also creates at least a theoretical possibility for reexamining the original UN concept for peacekeeping, centered on the role of the Military Staff Committee. While it will take time to establish Peking's interest in formal peacekeeping measures, we may find it useful ultimately to explore the feasibility of revitalizing the UN Charter's original peacekeeping concept. Even if this proves impossible, we shall want to see if Peking's presence enhances the possibility of moving the Soviets toward agreement on reasonable arrangements for consent-type peacekeeping missions.

<sup>\*</sup> Note: The evoking US/ROC relationship is the subject of a separate study. Pending availability of that study, which will provide the basis for decisions about defending the ROC's position in multilateral organizations, we assume that we will wish to keep the ROC engaged in multilateral diplomacy where it is reasonable and feasible, but without a great expenditure of diplomatic capital.



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It goes without saying that if Peking displays an interest in UN discussions relating to population, drug abuse, and environment, these discussions should also benefit from the PRC's presence. It may take some time to determine Peking's stance on this array of issues, however.

Perhaps the most interesting possibility opened up by Peking's participation is that of some form of UN political mediation between India and Pakistan. On the assumption that none of the five permanent SC members will see its interest served by an outbreak of major hostilities between India and Pakistan, the Security Council could perhaps play a role in preventing major hostilities and promoting a political settlement in East Pakistan. Peking's link with Pakistan will balance Moscow's with India and might conceivably establish a basis for a UN effort in which the five Permanent Members could help restrain Indian military moves while permitting a political solution in East Pakistan.

\* \* \*

No difficult policy choices have surfaced in preparing this paper. The problems are essentially tactical, how best to obtain PRC cooperation in particular cases, how best to deal with expected troublesome PRC actions, how best to protect some remaining ROC positions ithout a major expenditure of diplomatic capital. Common sense usually suggests the limits within which the answers will have to be found. It is clear that we must soon consult with the PRC on the next UN Secretary General. We shall have to deal with them when the India/Pakistan and Middle East issues are discussed in the UN. decisions will also soon have to be made on how to open the door for PRC participation in the discussions of arms limitation and oceans policy.



### I. On-Going Negotiations

#### A. Arms Limitation

The question of PRC participation in multilateral arms control forums is already being discussed at the current General Assembly, and some UN members are urging that action be taken on it at this session.

#### 1. US Objectives.

- -- Involve the PRC in multilateral arms control discussions while giving up as little as possible of the present institutional framework for such discussions (including a small and effective negotiating forum like the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) which usually works through consensus with no voting) and expose the PRC to the pressures and concerns to which the nuclear powers engaged in such discussions are subject.
- -- avoid institutionalization of a large new forum such as a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) or an unwieldy UN committee.
- -- facilitate the gradual identification of mutual US and PRC interests on substantive multilateral arms control issues.
- -- do all this in a manner that will avoid taking sides as between the PRC and the USSR and avoid undermining our constructive arms control relationship with the USSR, our allies and important non-aligned nations.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC will not join the CCD as presently constituted (with its US-USSR co-chairmanship) and might not agree to participate in any similar forum. Although the PRC has taken issue with the Soviet UNGA resolution calling




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for a World Disarmament Conference (WDC), it may later put forward its own WDC initiative and may press to replace the CCD with regular WDC meetings or some other new framework where constructive handling of arms control issues could be difficult and where the US could be exposed to hostile propaganda and resolutions. Eventually, however, the PRC may accept a relatively limited and effectively organized forum. Many UN members are intensely interested in achieving PRC participation in multilateral arms control activities and some may press for early changes in the present framework that would not be in the US interest.

On substance, the PRC's initial objective will probably be to develop broad international support for a prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons. The PRC has criticized the Limited Test Ban, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty as measures designed by the US and USSR to preserve their nuclear predominance. While unlikely to adhere to any of these treaties itself in the foreseeable future, the PRC may come to see broad acceptance by others of agreements like the NPT as being in its own best interest.

The PRC has not yet taken a position on the biological weapons convention negotiated at Geneva this year. Espousal of third-world causes may lead it to support prohibitions on chemical weapons production. The PRC will almost certainly not accept existing limitations on its own nuclear weapons testing program and will probably attempt instead to direct international pressure toward the US and the USSR for a comprehensive test ban. Nevertheless, should the US and USSR decide at some future time to seek agreement on an underground test ban, PRC participation in multilateral arms control talks might not inhibit achievement of such a measure. Along with support for the concept of nuclear free zones, the PRC may take a positive stance on the Ceylonese proposal for Indian Ocean demilitarization.





### 3. Alternative Courses of Action\*:

- a. We can propose (or accept) PRC participation in the 26-member CCD, or a similar forum, making clear we are ready to accept practical arrangements as a substitute for the US-USSR co-chairmanship and possibly the addition of a few new members. We could minimize the disadvantage noted below by attempting to develop, and then communicate widely to other UN members, a consensus among CCD members against substituting a large disarmament forum for a small one (in which PRC participation would be welcome). Advantages: This would help counter any erosion of support for a small forum even if the PRC does not participate.

  Disadvantages: If the PRC interpreted the move as applying pressure on it to join the CCD, it might react negatively.
- b. Discuss current multilateral arms control issues, both forums and substance, with the PRC UN delegation, making clear the value of a small multilateral forum and our willingness to try to work out an acceptable basis for PRC membership. advantages are that this is the most normal thing to do at the UN (we can be confident other countries will do so and that some will urge the PRC to take positions not in our interest); that we might influence the PRC toward acceptance of a smaller forum; and at least might learn more about PRC attitudes. It would have the disadvantages of provoking Soviet suspicion (especially if we did not also consult with them and others). and that the PRC might misunderstand and think we were trying to put on pressure and might assume a rigid adversary posture. (They may well do this in any case.)

<sup>\*</sup>Bilateral discussions with the PRC would not be affected by PRC participation -- or failure to participate -- in multilateral talks. NSSM-124 has outlined a number of specific arms control proposals (e.g. an exchange of information on nuclear weapons safeguards, a Washington-Peking hot line, a renunciation of force agreement) which we may wish to discuss with the PRC in substantive bilateral talks.

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- Press for regular CCD meetings in 1972 even if the PRC does not join. (Draft disarmament resolutions already being debated at the UNGA call on the CCD to continue its work.) Advantages are that we might buy time to work out a solution to the forums question through talks with the PRC and others; that we might increase the chance that the eventual solution would resemble the CCD; that we would avoid seeming paralyzed by the absence of PRC cooperation; and that we would -assuming the Soviets and others go along -- avoid Soviet resentment that we were more interested in accommodating the PRC than in continuing significant multilateral arms control talks with the USSR. The major disadvantage is that this course is apt to be widely interpreted in the UNGA as indicating unwillingness to facilitate PRC participation in the CCD, leading to considerable opposition to the forum itself.
- d. Play no active role, or a minimally active role, until we know more about PRC attitudes and the initiatives others may take. The advantage would be that we would avoid getting at cross purposes with the PRC -- and to some degree -- with the USSR. Disadvantages are that by waiting we risk having the PRC and others take steps that will move the play, particularly on forums, in a direction not in our interest and having the issues we now face posed later in more acute and disadvantageous ways. The Soviets and our allies would probably consider US passivity in itself an abandonment of our leadership (with the USSR) and the arms control field.
- e. If PRC membership in a reorganized CCD or similar forum is not worked out, we could propose or support a meeting of the UNDC. Advantages are that a UNDC could provide a transitional step for PRC (and French) participation in a new forum like the CCD. A UNDC would also undercut pressures for a WDC and would have several advantages over the latter, including the fact that it would be held within the UN framework and the question of divided states would be easier to handle.





<u>Disadvantages</u> would be the unwieldiness and propagandistic nature of a UNDC, the danger of pressures to institutionalize regular UNDC meetings, and the unlikelihood that such a meeting would by itself bring a constructive solution to the forums.

f. Wait until after the President's visit to Peking for bilateral talks on forums and substance. Advantages are that the visit might dispel Chinese suspicions, could allow us to learn more about PRC attitudes, and might create a greater PRC readiness to work constructively with us on arms control issues. If the forums issue had not been previously resolved, it might be easier to deal with after such talks. Disadvantages are that the forums question may move rapidly prior to the President's visit, compelling us to handle it without having had contact with PRC officials on the issues, and that we would forego the chance to influence the PRC on substantive UNGA arms control issues.

#### B. Ocean Problems

Likely to arise first in the First Committee of the General Assembly sometime soon after December 1, 1971.

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Engage PRC interest and cooperation in achieving the objectives stated in NSDM-62 and NSDM-122 (too complex to summarize here). If this proves impossible, find more limited areas of common interest. Work to provide for ROC accession to any international agreements that result.

## 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems.

Territorial Seas. In his opening statement at the UN, Chiao Kuan-hua repeated the PRC support for the 200-mile territorial sea claims of certain Latin American



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
countries (e.g. Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil). A 200-'mile territorial sea is the most extreme position in the negotiations, and is not currently supported by more than a half dozen countries. The PRC does not make equivalent claims, but may well attempt to establish its leadership among developing countries by attracting them to this position. It appears that the major reason for its support of these claims is a desire to make common cause with these LA's and to depict the US as an imperialist state trying to rob its LDC neighbors in Latin America of their natural resources. On the other hand, the PRC will find that many LDCs (for example, all landlocked and shelf-locked) oppose 200 mile claims.

Straits. Chinese trade and her limited need for military mobility require the ability to pass through the straits of Malacca and the Indonesian straits to reach South Asia and Africa. This, plus the fact that the PRC does not itself straddle any major international straits less than 24 miles wide, would indicate that it will not have any direct interest in expanding coastal State control over transit through straits. On the other hand, the PRC could view restrictions on straits transit as hindering the military mobility of the US and the USSR while only baving a limited effect on her military interests since her navy is presently coastal-oriented. Also the NCNA recently reported favorably on a statement by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore that they had complete control over the Strait of Malacca.

Seabeds. The PRC attitude toward the US proposed draft convention on the seabeds is much clearer. It has denounced our draft as "a futile attempt to dominate the oceans" and has characterized it as an attempt to deprive countries of their sovereign rights over ocean resources.

Yet the PRC would have interest in being more charitable toward our seabeds proposal. Most of the area that it claims in the East China and Yellow Seas





lies within the 200-meter isobath (depth line), and acceptance of this criterion would give a strong basis to the PRC position on division of the shelf. In the South China Sea, there are large areas that are deeper than 200 meters that might be within the US-proposed trusteeship area for coastal State control. Thus the PRC would under our proposal have a claim to seabed exploitation jurisdiction over a much larger area than she would have under any mileage alternative such as the 200-mile economic resource zone that has been supported by many developing countries. Moreover, because of deep trenches immediately to the west of the Ryukyus, the PRC would be better off if Japan's jurisdiction were limited by depth rather than distance.

Fisheries, Marine Pollution and Scientific Research. The PRC has not indicated any attitude on these issues as they were discussed in the UN Seabeds Committee.

Questions of PRC Participation in Law of the Sea Conference and Seabed Committee Preparatory Work. The PRC will surely attend the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference. It is not clear, however, whether the PRC wants to become a member of the 86-nation Seabed Committee which is preparing for that conference. (The ROC was not a member of the Seabed Committee.) We have had an indication recently from a member of the Norwegian Delegation to the UN that the Law of the Sea is an area in which the PRC would want to become actively involved.

We anticipate that, if included in the preparatory work and in the Conference itself, the PRC will attempt to identify with the LDCs and create problems for us by encouraging the 200-mile Latin Americans. There is a danger that this will seriously damage the prospects for achievement of our objectives.





#### 3. Suggested Actions.

- a. Support (and perhaps join in) proposals by other countries to expand the membership of the Seabed Committee to include the PRC and perhaps initiate such a proposal. Advantages: Avoids a hassle that we would lose; encourages PRC cooperation in the negotiations; would not offend the ROC since it was not a member. We would be doing no more than going along with the inevitable, and it is neither desirable nor warranted for us to oppose PRC participation. Initiative would gain us some credit for facing reality. Disadvantages: Provides opportunity for obstructionism if PRC wishes to do so; adds one to the number of US opponents.
- b. Assuming that the PRC is added to the Seabed Committee and participates in its preparatory work. initiate bilateral discussions of the issues and problems to be dealt with by the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference before the PRC makes too many more commitments to others. Advantages are that it would indicate to the PRC and others our desire to have meaningful negotiations on these issues; would give each country an opportunity to understand better the position, interests and problems of the other; would emphasize to the PRC the importance that we attached to the subject; could stimulate more attention to immediate PRC interests in the Law of the Sea rather than the use of the subject for political and propaganda purposes; and could result in certain important areas of cooperation between us based on similar interests. Failure to reach immediate agreement in such talks on any specific points would probably not have any adverse effect on our relations. The disadvantage is the possible adverse effect on some of the maritime nations who generally support us, in particular the Soviet Union and Japan, which can be offset by careful attention to their sensitivities in this regard.



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
Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is on the agenda of the Special Political Committee (SPC) for early to mid-December. The Special Peacekeeping Committee should meet shortly to consider and approve its brief and anodyne report to the SPC.

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. We hope to achieve, with PRC cooperation, practical and workable guidelines for future UN peacekeeping operations. To this end, we must avoid the confluence of USSR and PRC attitudes in peacekeeping discussions.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. If the PRC decides to participate in UN peacekeeping discussions, it could object strongly to the current notion in the UN that progress is not possible until US-Soviet differences over "guidelines" are resolved. Since it is doubtful that alternative means of handling the UN discussions would be agreed, the PRC will have to choose between participation or non-participation. The Co-Chairmen of the Peacekeeping Committee (Canada and Czechoslovakia) have been authorized to explore the PRC's intentions.

The PRC has two broad policy options, either of which could be portrayed as consistent with past themes in Chinese policy:

a. it could adopt a negative stand toward UN peacekeeping on the grounds that UN operations constitute intrusion by foreign forces and interference in the rights of nations to settle their own affairs. The PRC might also reason that UN operations would be designed to maintain the status quo and would thus work against "national liberation" movements;



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b. it could find an interest in strengthening UN machinery to afford the non-aligned an alternative to "super-power" domination.

Procedurally, the PRC could theoretically favor a greater General Assembly role in authorizing and controlling peacekeeping operations in order to reduce "superpower" control over peacekeeping operations through the Security Council and to take advantage of the numerical edge enjoyed by the non-aligned in the Assembly. More likely, however, the PRC will wish to reserve maximum possible control of operational matters to the Security Council or subordinate bodies where the PRC could exercise its veto, and will wish to limit the discretion of the Secretary General.


PRC attitudes are thus more likely to strengthen the Soviet position on command and control of UN peace-keeping operations. If the PRC presses this view jointly with the USSR, the US could be virtually isolated in the Peacekeeping Committee.

Peking's participation in the UN also creates at least a theoretical possibility for reexamining the original UN concept for peacekeeping, centered on the role of the Military Staff Committee.

On the whole, we expect the PRC to consider individual peacekeeping proposals in relation to their impact on specific Chinese interests. For example, the PRC might not obstruct UN peacekeeping machinery in the Middle East if such was compatible with the then-current status of Chinese interests vis-a-vis the Arab governments in the area.

3. Suggested Actions. We do not know enough about likely PRC attitudes on UN peacekeeping to judge accurately the impact of their participation. It may be that others (Canada for instance) will be better able to elicit and perhaps to influence PRC views. We therefore suggest that we:





- -- postpone peacekeeping discussions in the UN rather than force PRC representatives to premature and unhelpful conclusions;
- -- accept, but not solicit, PRC participation in peacekeeping discussions;
- -- encourage a serious, non-propagandistic PRC approach towards the complex problems of peacekeeping.

#### D. Outer Space

The question of PRC membership in the Outer Space Committee may arise during the course of the current General Assembly.

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Seek to engage the PRC in UN outer space affairs. In that context, attempt to establish a cooperative US-PRC relationship based at least to some degree on congruent interests in expanding the peaceful uses of outer space.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. Thus far we have no specific indicators of PRC attitudes toward outer space affairs in the UN. They would likely be receptive to an invitation to join the Outer Space Committee, regarding this as appropriate to their status in the space field as well as offering another vehicle for asserting their opposition to alleged superpower hegemony. They could also feel that Committee membership would give them more leverage over space issues about which they feel particular concern, presumably including the use of earth resource survey and direct broadcast satellites.

### 3. Alternative Courses of Action


a. Outer Space Liability Convention. Encourage the PRC to become an early signatory of the Outer Space






Liability Convention, which has received UNGA endorsement at the current session, as well as the Outer Space Treaty and Astronaut Rescue and Return Treaty. (We could work for ROC accession as well since these conventions have triple-depositary clauses -- as discussed in the section on adherence to conventions.) Advantages: This would be a minimum-cost affirmative gesture toward the PRC. recognizing its current status and potential importance in space matters including its capacity of becoming a "launching State" under the Liability Convention. PRC accession to the Convention would probably provide a stimulus to others to follow suit, which is in our overall policy interest. Disadvantages: The Chinese might at least initially reject our invitation to join the Convention, alleging that it is the product of excessive US-USSR coordination. However, nothing would be lost in making the gesture.


b. UN Outer Space Committee Membership. should be quick to support an invitation to the PRC to become a member of the Outer Space Committee. Advantages: The Outer Space Committee would seem to be one of the UN forums in which prospects are favorable for gradual accommodation of US and PRC positions on some relevant issues. PRC membership in the Committee seems both desirable and logical. As a country which already has some space capabilities, the PRC clearly "belongs." Disadvantages: PRC membership could pose problems. especially in the short run. Insofar as the Chinese choose to play the role of Third World spokesman, they could complicate proceedings by alleging superpower collusion on space matters in the UN. Chinese sensitivities on what are perceived as sovereignty questions could augment pressures to take up legal problems relating to direct broadcast as well as earth survey satellites. (However, these problems would exist in any case.)





Earth Resource Surveys. The UN's Earth resource survey (ERS) program was given impetus earlier this year with Outer Space Committee establishment of a Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites (WGRS). Upon becoming a member of the Committee the PRC should be encouraged to participate actively in the Working Group. Advantages: At least from the scientific-technical standpoint, such participation would be mutually advantageous. Assuming that the Chinese became Outer Space Committee members within the next few months, they would be able to participate in the initial substantive work of the WGRS, planned to begin in 1972 as data from the NASA experimental satellite ERTS-A become available. They thus could join in a potentially rewarding UN activity just as it promised to begin to yield meaningful results. (Chinese scientists should be invited to submit experiments for subsequent US ERS flights.) Disadvantages: Undercurrents of concern have already become apparent among many member States regarding what they perceive as potential threats to their sovereignty and opportunities for economic espionage on the part of those launching ERS satellites. The PRC would very likely share those concerns and, even if it did not, would face the temptation to exploit the fears of others to the possible detriment of the UN program as well as US interests in the development of ERS technology.





#### II. Political Issues

#### A. Korea

We presently support, and the PRC publicly takes issue with all aspects of the UN involvement in Korea: the resolutions passed by the General Assembly and the Security Council establishing the basis for UN intervention in the Korean War and condemning North Korean and Chinese aggression; the General Assembly resolution establishing the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK); and the Security Council resolution establishing the United Nations Command (UNC) and placing it under the direction of the United States.

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Our objective is to try to improve the political climate on the Korean peninsula and remove its problems as bones of contention between north and south, and between China and the US within the UN and outside. We wish to avoid a full-scale confrontation on these issues with the PRC; prevent a repudiation of the UN role in Korea; and maintain whatever aspects of the UN presence are useful to stability in the peninsula, discarding those that are not. At the same time, we wish to maintain the credibility of US defense commitments in the area.

Our overall policy in Korea is presently under review through the PARA mechanism.

2. Chinese Attitudes. China considers herself a wronged party of the Korean War. In view of this and her relations with North Korea she will undoubtedly attempt to take positions in the UN to reflect this. The PRC has singled out UNCURK for special criticism as a creation of the United States and considers it an instrument of unilateral US policy. It has in the past denounced all the UN resolutions relating to the Korean War and has called for their nullification. They were mentioned in the



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PRC's maiden speech but in muted fashion. The PRC has objected to the presence of US forces in Korea but did not make a direct issue of this in its maiden speech. We have no reason to think the PRC wishes to disband the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in the absence of an overall settlement.

#### 3. Alternative Courses of Action.

Two Koreas in the United Nations. The United States could propose that both North Korea and the Republic of Korea be admitted to the United Nations in 1972. This would be consistent with the growing trend toward universality of membership and could be acceptable to the ROK.

Admission of two Koreas would greatly accelerate development of North-South bilateral relations. The ROK would be able to carry the weight of its own defense in the UN, relieving the US of a part of this responsibility. Among the advantages is that the PRC or USSR would be placed on the defensive if they opposed the move or if North Korea rejected it.

- b. Changes in Parliamentary Tactics. If it is not feasible to propose admittance of two Koreas as soon as 1972, the United States could initiate adoption of a resolution inviting both Koreas to participate in the Korean debate at the next GA, without the usual conditions.
- c. Maintenance of the Korean War Resolutions. It is not in our interest that these resolutions be brought up again. If the PRC seeks to repeal them, we should not hesitate to make clear we oppose the rewriting of history. It may be possible to deflect PRC moves in this direction if we are able to take initiatives under alternative courses a and d.



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- ď. Dissolution of UNCURK. We believe that if the UN apparatus for Korea proves useful as a bargaining counter with the PRC, we should consider using it in this fashion. UNCURK is of marginal utility and could be discontinued provided we and the ROK have a common understanding on alternative approaches to the question of unification. We could minimize embarrassment to ourselves by obtaining Australian (UNCURK member) assent to propose its dissolution or seek ROK assent to propose dissolution or modification of UNCURK's role. The latter, while unlikely to obtain PRC approval, could preserve a residual UN interest in Korea.
- e. Relinquishment of the United Nations Command (UNC).
  The UNC no longer reflects the international community which assisted Korea in 1950. The umbrella it provides for US Command relationships with the ROK is likely to be more embarrassment than shelter in the future.

The important elements of the UNC apparatus are: maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, the channel of communication between us and North Korea through the Military Armistice Commission; the UN SOFA; and Operational Control of the ROK armed forces exercised by the UNC/US. Maintenance of the Armistice Agreement would require tacit if not explicit agreement among the four parties concerned (US, PRC, ROK and DPRK) that the ROK would assume this obligation and might require that the US remain in the MAC in a subsidiary role. The question of operational control should be examined for its consistency with the Nixon Doctrine of increased self-reliance. Our control could be terminated after we work out a bilateral command relationship with the ROK.



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#### B. Middle East

Plenary discussion of the Middle East is scheduled for the first half of December.

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Prevent PRC actions and statements from disrupting or complicating US efforts to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement; limit PRC (and Soviet) influence among the political factors in the Middle East; use PRC-Soviet differences, wherever feasible, to further US objectives.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC no doubt sees continued instability in the Middle East, and continued sparring between the US and USSR, as serving its interests by keeping Soviet attention directed away from East Asia.

The PRC has selectively supported the Palestinian cause and other "radical" causes in the Middle East, perhaps to show its credentials as a "revolutionary" and to outflank the USSR. While the PRC's actions in a more formal negotiating framework might be more restrained out of consideration for the views of the Arab governments, PRC attitudes are likely to have a disruptive influence.

The PRC seems disinclined to participate in Four Power talks on the Middle East, and while it has neither accepted nor formally rejected SC resolution 242, it has taken positions at variance with its provisions; it is therefore unclear whether the PRC would support settlement efforts in the UN framework, even if they were agreeable to other SC members and the Arab states concerned.

3. Suggested Actions. There is no feasible alternative to continued US efforts to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. SC resolution 242 is not sacrosanct, but there is little prospect of a more widely agreed basis for negotiations on such a settlement.

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



US objectives to the present time have been well served by utilization of UN machinery (SYG representative, UN Truce Observers, SC resolution 242). The US should therefore continue its current Middle East efforts utilizing UN machinery as necessary and feasible, and await concrete indications of PRC interests or objectives regarding the Middle East negotiations.

If the PRC seeks to play a role in talks about a settlement, the US should insist (and seek British, French and Soviet consensus) that the PRC accept Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis both of negotiations and of a final settlement; seek to limit PRC efforts to influence Arab governments adversely or to disrupt Middle East negotiations; and continue with multiple bilateral diplomacy outside the UN (or Four or Five Power) context, insofar as PRC actions inhibit or preclude progress in that context.

### C. India-Pakistan

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Although they have taken different approaches to the India-Pakistan crisis, the US, the USSR and the PRC all have an interest in preventing full-scale war in South Asia. Our primary objective with respect to the PRC in the multilateral context is to have it join in attempting to reach a public consensus in the GA or the SC on the necessity of averting or stopping a war between India and Pakistan by persuading the parties to seek a peaceful settlement of the crisis. (A related US objective is to persuade the PRC to play a constructive bilateral role with the parties.)
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC has vital interests in South Asia, thus its attitudes will be an important factor in any UN consideration of the crisis. The PRC has supported the position of Pakistan





and has condemned India in the UN for its interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. On the one hand the PRC has spoken of "resolutely supporting the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle" if Pakistan is attacked, which might imply PRC military intervention in a conflict situation and refusal to work with the UN. On the other hand, it has endorsed Yahya's withdrawal of forces proposal and has expressed the hope that the people of Pakistan will seek "a reasonable settlement" to the East Pakistan question, which suggests that the PRC might support diplomatic efforts in the UN and elsewhere to prevent or stop a full-scale war.

Some indication of PRC attitudes and tactics emerged from the recent discussion in the GA of the refugee and relief aspects of the crisis. Although the PRC supported the GOP and condemned Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, it went along with a consensus statement giving formal support to the UN relief efforts and calling upon all member states "to intensify their efforts to bring about conditions necessary for the voluntary repatriation of the refugees."

In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, one problem which might arise is the composition of any UN observer mission posted along the international boundary of India and Pakistan to supervise a cease-fire. The PRC might press for the inclusion of Chinese observers or observers from countries friendly to the PRC despite -- or because of -- probable Indian objections.

3. Alternative Courses of Action. In the present prehostilities situation, the main question facing the US
in the UN is whether to support SC consideration of the
India-Pakistan crisis. In light of its recent position
in the General Assembly, it seems likely that while the
PRC will associate itself with the position of Pakistan,
it might be able to compromise on a balanced SC resolution.





So far we have relied on bilateral efforts by the US and other interested governments to ease tensions in South Asia and to encourage a peaceful accommodation between the GOP and the people of East Pakistan. The entry of the PRC to the UN need not necessarily cause us to change this policy, but it provides us, at a minimum, an opportunity to deal with the Chinese directly and privately in New York, with a view to coordinating our bilateral approaches for maximum impact on the parties. Through such bilateral discussions we should be able to make a better assessment of PRC attitudes towards UN involvement in the India-Pakistan question, even if no coordinated approaches prove possible.

Should the PRC favor pre-hostilities SC consideration, we would be in a stronger position, having isolated India and the USSR, who have opposed SC action, to work toward either a consensus statement of the members of the SC or a meeting resulting in a hortatory resolution.

In the event of further deterioration of the situation or the outbreak of hostilities, it is probable that the Security Council would meet and pass a resolution. SC consideration would present an opportunity to reach a public consensus of all the great powers on the necessity of averting a war between India and Pakistan by persuading the parties to seek a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, the PRC and the USSR might decide to support their clients to such an extent that either would veto a balanced resolution and render the SC powerless to deal with the situation. If this happens the situation will deteriorate but the US, if it takes a more even-handed approach, might have an opportunity to play the role of peacemaker similar to that played by the USSR at Tashkent in 1966.





#### D. Southern Africa

The United States and the PRC can be expected to take opposing positions in the Security Council on southern African issues. This will arise almost immediately as the issues of Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and Namibia are discussed in the Council, the Sanctions Committee, and the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia.

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Seek to have PRC initiatives and positions examined in the context of practical possibilities for peaceful change toward racial equality and social justice in southern Africa.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC will try to maximize its influence in Africa at the expense of the West and the Soviet Union. To this end they will seize upon racial and colonial problems and seek to set themselves up as the champions of human rights, African aspirations and liberation group objectives.

Peking's goals will be to assert leadership in the Afro-Asian group, to act as its spokesman in the Security Council (and in the process curtail Soviet influence and estrange Japan from the A-A group); and to promote conditions in southern Africa which would be more favorable to a revolutionary situation.

Chinese-Soviet competition in anti-colonial rhetoric may make things more difficult for us in New York. Moreover, the PRC's use of the UN forum to exacerbate problems in southern Africa has great potential for bringing the PRC into conflict with US national interests in the area.





3. Suggested Actions. We will continue to work for and support efforts designed to promote peaceful change in southern Africa. At the same time, we should seek to restrain the African tendency to edge the General Assembly and the Security Council closer to invocations of the use of force, application of sanctions, ejection of South Africa and Portugal from the UN, and active material support for "liberation movements." We will need to be ready to support or propose positive alternative resolutions associating ourselves with African aspirations for self-determination and opposition to apartheid.

To assist in this effort we can work closely with the black African states that are suspicious of PRC motives; point out to the white minority regimes the undesirability of repressive policies that play into PRC hands; and seek to convince the Africans that their interests would be better served by approaches commanding broad support than by the extreme measures which the PRC might propose.

#### E. Taiwan

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. As it does not serve US interests to raise the Taiwan issue in the UN, our principal problem is how best to respond to PRC attacks on our policy toward the ROC to limit the damage from the campaign that the PRC will be waging against us. We must be concerned about possible damage to our developing relations with the PRC, to US/ROC relations and US interests in the Taiwan area, and to the international position of the ROC.

### 2. PRC Attitude and Attendant Problems.

PRC Objectives. Impress the world with its determination to secure the removal of US forces from Taiwan, undermine the basis for the US/ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and the "liberation" of Taiwan. Destroy the remaining international support for US ties with the ROC, and generally isolate the ROC internationally by demanding



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severance of relations with it, both diplomatic and economic, as the price for relations with the PRC.

Possible PRC Action in the UN. Among many initiatives open to it in addition to attacking us in speeches, the PRC could introduce a resolution charging that US"occupation" of Taiwan constitutes aggression and interference in the PRC's internal affairs and also a violation of UNGA Res. 291 (IV). It could also assert, in connection with an initiative calling for repeal of the Korean "aggressor" resolutions, that their repeal would end any justification for US forces in the Taiwan area.

3. Alternative US Courses of Action. These range from "Full Reply" to "No Reply at UN", with "Brief Reply" the most likely to meet our broader objectives. Major Advantages and Disadvantages. The fuller the reply, the more we rehearse positions and arguments that annoy Peking. The fuller the debate, the more we also become publicly locked into our present positions. Not to make any reply to a PRC attack, however, runs the risk of conveying a false signal that we regard our position as weak, which in turn might stimulate the frequency and intensity of PRC attacks.

To minimize the effects of PRC attempts to discredit us we would, at a minimum, respond to attacks with an objective reiteration of US policy on the Taiwan issue. We would point out that we have no predefery designs on Taiwan or on any other Chinese territory, do not desire any rights or privileges, and do not seek any permanent military bases. We could add that our forces are present on Taiwan with the consent of the government there. The Albanian Resolution related to representation in the UN and has no applicability to bilateral relations. We would express our hope that US/PRC disagreement on this issue would not preclude businesslike relations in the UN on other matters.

If there are any opportunities for private conversations with the Chinese during which talking about this



subject would be appropriate, we could state that public discussion could force us to reiterate our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and our views on the status of Taiwan. We could also suggest that the interests of both sides would best be served by not having to debate this issue in the UN.

#### F. Viet-Nam

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. At a minimum, prevent PRC presence in the UN from frustrating our objectives in Viet-Nam; and at a maximum utilize this presence to engage the PRC actively in pursuit of peace.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. PRC cooperation in ending the war in the immediate future is unlikely as such action could be viewed by North Viet-Nam and other communist nations as a lessening of the PRC's revolutionary fervor, thus decreasing PRC influence in Hanoi in favor of Moscow. In the short run, the PRC may use the UN as a platform to attack US policy in Viet-Nam. Or the PRC might seek UN membership for the DRV (or for the DRV and PRG). On the plus side, PRC membership in the UN provides new opportunities for private talks between the US and the PRC on the problem of a Viet-Nam settlement. Issues to be explored would include POW-MIA matters, economic rehabilitation and, perhaps, security guarantees.

### Suggested Actions.

a. Post-war cooperation. Attempt to engage the PRC (and the UN in general) in a program to provide for the post-war economic development of North and South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia under UN auspices. Such an approach would have a greater chance of success if the US were not in the forefront. Eventually it might be broadened to include security arrangements under a UN umbrella, which would help fulfill the vision of the Nixon Doctrine.




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b. UN admission for DRV and RVN. Such a proposal would almost certainly meet strong opposition from the USSR and the PRC who would take the line either (1) that unification of Viet-Nam must come first or (2) that the southern part of Viet-Nam should be represented in the UN by the Communist Provisional Revolutionary Government, not by the "puppet" RVN. Seating the RVN in the UN would have the obvious advantage for us of strengthening theinternational position of the RVN and justifying our position that one state, North Viet-Nam, is attacking another, South Viet-Nam. admission idea might be explored at a future date should we have indications of a relaxation in the Soviet and Chinese attitudes.

#### G. Cambodia

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Defeat PRC moves to question the legality of the Khmer Republic (GKR) in the UN and pursue any indication it may be interested in exploring real solutions to the Cambodian problem.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC, along with about 20 other nations or quasi-governments recognize Prince Sihanouk's exile "Royal Government of National Union" (RGNU); 48 nations recognize the GKR. There have been reports that the PRC intends to challenge the credentials of the GKR in the UN. Romania has now three times challenged the legitimacy of the GKR in international forums, and the GKR was challenged by Cuba during the UNGA general debate on November 4. These developments could presage a concerted effort to oust the GKR from the UN.
- 3. Suggested Actions. The GKR has a strong case and we would support it. Some acrimony would be inevitable, however, since it is hard to discuss Cambodia without also discussing Viet-Nam. We should try to limit the discussion to the legal and political case for the legitimacy of the GKR.

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#### H. Micronesia

The Trusteeship Council's report on Micronesia will be discussed, probably in a routine fashion, at the current General Assembly. A more likely moment for the PRC to weigh in on the matter will be when the Trusteeship Council next takes it up in May, 1972.

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. We wish to limit PRC ability to interfere with our plans to liquidate our trust mandate and establish an internally self-governing Micronesia associated with the US, with, at a minimum, US control over Micronesian external affairs and defense. Our interests in the islands themselves include denial of access to potentially unfriendly powers and the free use of certain land areas for military purposes.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. PRC pressures on the Trust Territory will reflect a desire to depict the US as "colonialist" plus a wish to limit or even preclude US use of the area for military bases. The PRC will probably attack the concept of US bases as detrimental to the Micronesian people, criticize the quality of US administration of the islands, encourage those Micronesian groups which desire independence, and may attempt to work behind the scenes to stiffen the bargaining position of the Micronesian negotiating team. As a member of the Trusteeship Council, the Security Council and probably the Committee of 24, the PRC will have adequate forums for these activities. The PRC could try to persuade the Trusteeship Council not to recommend approval of a new Micronesian status compact and could exercise its veto to block any Security Council approval of the compact.

The PRC will almost certainly try to block our plan to accommodate the Marianas' desire to separate from the rost of Micronesia and seek a close, permanent association with the US.



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
3. Suggested Actions. We will be able to outvote the PRC in the Trusteeship Council (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Australia) and given parliamentary advoitness should be able to prevent passage of damaging resolutions in the Security Council itself. Should the new status compact be submitted to the Security Council for approval, however, the PRC (and the USSR) would be able to cast a veto. Under these circumstances, we might have to take the position that the terms of the trusteeship agreement will be satisfied by notification to the Council and that explicit Council approval is not required. While this position probably is legally sustainable, we would have to take some flak in the process, not only in the Council but in the news media as well.

PRC interference with our plans would best be contained by working to assure solid popular support in Micronesia for the compact and for association with the US. This will require that we devote more time, attention, and money to informational activities in Micronesia, that we focus more on the quality of our administration of the islands and meet Micronesian grievances, and that we be as flexible and forthcoming in the current negotiations as our interests permit.

#### I. Specialized Agencies

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Minimize the tendency to politicize the specialized agencies which is likely to be accentuated by PRC entry. Preserve a place for the ROC in certain special cases and provide pragmatic solutions to maintain the technical benefits it stands to lose through expulsion from the others.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC has made it clear that it desires to drive the ROC from each of the specialized agencies. To achieve this goal it may indicate initial interest in all of the agencies, even if it has no intention of participating, as is possible






in at least the financial organizations. There are as yet no indications of real PRC interest in working in any of the agencies. What is all but certain is that the PRC will probably support those members, particularly the Africans, who pursue political goals in them.

#### 3. Suggested Actions.

- a. Toward the PRC. We have little alternative but to continue our policy of opposing use of the agencies for political motives and specifically of opposing moves to expel South Africa and Portugal. At the same time, it would be in our interest to involve the PRC in the technical operations of those agencies it does enter, so that an awareness of the complex practical matters at hand may eventually lessen its appetite for time-consuming political debate at technical conferences.
- Ъ. Toward the ROC. We are continuing to seek ways to preserve ROC membership in at least the financial institutions but the problem is complicated by the tendency of a majority of members to give a very broad interpretation to the Albanian Resolution. Even in the financial institutions the problem could become insoluble if the PRC actively pursues membership in them. We hope to assist the ROC in working out arrangements with some of the agencies whereby it can continue to benefit from or participate in technical activities (international mail, radio frequencies, weather watch etc.). Arrangements of this sort have been worked out for non-members in the past, notably East Germany.





#### III. Economic and Social Issues

#### A. Environment

The PRC is likely to attend, and play an active role at, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which meets in Stockholm in June 1972.

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Due to the global nature of environmental problems to be considered by the Conference, work to obtain constructive participation by the PRC at Stockholm and in other UN-sponsored environmental activities.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. Available intelligence indicates a growing PRC interest and concern with industrial pollution. At the Stockholm Conference, we expect that the PRC will champion the views espoused by most LDCs, notably the proposition that global pollution is caused principally by the highly developed countries as a consequence of their industrial activity and associated technologies. Therefore, it is up to the developed world to finance corrective measures.

The PRC also is likely to take the view that environmental problems in the LDCs largely reflect their economic backwardness and can be solved only by "socialist" development. They will readily fall in with the view that the developed nations should not take any environmental decisions which will impair the LDC development process. By championing these views, the PRC will help to make it much more difficult to devise formulas for solutions acceptable to the developed and developing nations.






#### 3. Suggested Actions.

- a. Persuade Maurice Strong, the Secretary-General of the UN Conference, to explore Chinese views on international environmental problems and the Conference.
- b. Persuade friendly nations interested in the success of the Conference (Canada and Sweden ) to emphasize in discussions with the Chinese the importance of a successful Conference.
- c. In view of the President's interest in the success of the Conference, he or a member of his staff may wish to discuss the Conference with Chinese officials during his visit to Peking.
- d. Propose bilateral exchanges on environmental problems with the Chinese which could be discussed during the President's visit.

#### B. Drug Control

A UN Conference will meet in March 1972 to consider amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The Conference, and the proposed amendments, are a result of a US initiative to put teeth into the international mechanism to control narcotics production and traffic.

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Our maximum objective would be to obtain active PRC assistance in international drug control, particularly in the area of southeast Asia adjoining her borders, as well as to provide for ROC accession to any international agreements that are developed. If the PRC is not interested or will oppose us in this field for political reasons, we must try to reason with them while minimizing their potential for trouble.



- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC appears to have developed an excellent record of internal narcotics control; although there are occasional unconfirmed reports to the contrary, we have no evidence that it has engaged in illicit international traffic, despite the mischief this could have created for our troops in Vietnam.
- 3. Alternative Courses of Action. Consult at an early opportunity with the PRC to determine its basic attitude toward the problem, and explain the intent of our proposals for the Convention.

If its attitude is positive, draw the PRC deeply into the problem by supporting its election to the Commission on Narcotics Drugs at the May 1972 ECOSOC meeting; and ascertain whether it would be willing to use its influence to help control illicit traffic in the "Golden Triangle" area of Burma, Cambodia, Laos.

If PRC attitudes are negative, seek to minimize the effects at the Conference by stressing the non-political and humanitarian nature of our proposals. Try to make the PRC aware, preferably through other delegations, that its negative position could be very costly in terms of international opinion. Encourage such relatively non-controversial steps as PRC accession to the existing narcotics treaty or the recently adopted Convention for the Control of Psychotropic Substances.

#### C. Other Economic and Social Questions

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Convince the PRC that it is to everyone's advantage to reassert the authority of ECOSOC over other UN economic bodies as the primary organ for planning and coordinating the economic, social and human rights programs of the UN system; minimize the damage from likely PRC efforts to



exacerbate differences between developed and developing countries on the full range of these problems; promote responsible PRC participation in those programs and activities which it elects to join; preserve orderly marketing and pricing arrangements through the participation of both the PRC, and the ROC if possible; and seek the completion or gradual and orderly phasing-out of the UNDP program on Taiwan.

. . .

2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC is likely to try to assume leadership of the LDCs in the economic bodies and espouse programs which the US will find difficult to support. However, the PRC, like the USSR, may find it difficult to maintain this role unless it is willing to contribute substantial sums to LDC development through the UN system. On the other hand, the US is likely to be subjected to political attacks that attempt to accentuate our differences with the LDCs. We will undoubtedly be subjected to long polemical statements which assert the predominance of socialist economic and social principles over those of the free enterprise system. Actual PRC intentions with respect to participation in many of these activities are still unknown.

#### 3. Suggested Actions.

- a. ECOSOC, UNCTAD, UNDP
- -- Welcome PRC participation in these bodies, seek its support for our positions on the need to coordinate their work and curtail the uncontrolled growth of programs in the UN system.
- -- Counter likely propaganda attacks with straightforward statements of US activities on behalf of the under-developed countries and suggestions that Chinese aid be funneled increasingly through multilateral organizations.

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-- If the PRC proves completely intractable, take advantage of divisions within LDC ranks to prevent the PRC attaining a position as spokesman for the whole group.

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#### b. Population Control

- -- Encourage General William H. Draper, our Representative to the UN Population Commission, to visit Peking to persuade the PRC to contribute to the UN Fund for Population Activities and to support generally UN population efforts.
- -- Continue to take the lead, as we did at the recent session of the Population Commission, where we co-sponsored an invitation to the PRC to send an observer to the December session. Obvious opportunities are the Asian Population Conference to be held under ECAFE auspices in 1972 (in Tokyo) and the World Population Conference and the World Population Year, 1974.
- -- If PRC attitudes toward increasing UN involvement in population activities prove to be negative, seek to minimize PRC influence by pointing out that it in fact encourages family planning at home; and urging leading African and other LDCs to make clear to PRC delegates that UN technical assistance for national population programs is desired by many UN members.

#### c. International Commodity Activities

The problems and opportunities arising from PRC participation will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis. We could consult the PRC on these matters, but this might imply an eagerness, which we do not have, to see them





join the specialized commodity bodies. It seems preferable to await developments.


Where the PRC elects to come into a commodity study group, we should welcome it and stress the essential contribution it can make by providing the information regarding its production and trade which is needed for an accurate assessment of the world market situation.

The more immediate US policy problem is the preservation, in the interests of orderly marketing, of ROC membership in certain commodity groups where it has significant trade interests, e.g. the present International Sugar Agreement and any successor. If this is not feasible, it will be necessary to find ways, appropriate to each case, and outside the framework of the commodity arrangement, to protect the ROC's interests and preserve the orderly marketing and pricing which are in our own national interest.

#### D. Red Cross Conference

The PRC will be invited to attend a May, 1972 Conference, sponsored by the Red Cross, which will consider revisions to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Obtain PRC support for, or if impossible, prevent its obstruction of the Conference of government experts on the laws of war, sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (We hope the Conference will ultimately result in adoption of several protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, expanding somewhat the protections of those conventions, particularly with respect to internal conflicts, and hopefully improving compliance with the Conventions.)



- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. The PRC, as a party to the Conventions, is invited to participate. It declined to attend the May 1971 session but is more likely to attend now that the UN representation question is resolved. While we cannot be certain of the positions the PRC will take, it seems likely to support anticolonial provisions on freedom-fighters and efforts to ban or restrict the use of napalm and perhaps other weapons. A further Red Cross issue involves attendance at the next General International Red Cross Conference (1973). In the past, the governments of both the PRC and ROC have been invited to the Conference; the ROC has attended, the PRC has not. If past practice on invitations were followed (and it may not be), the ROC would be invited and the PRC therefore would continue not to attend.
- 3. Alternative Courses of Action. It is premature at this stage to set forth detailed alternatives for dealing with possible PRC positions. In any event, we should be able to obtain sufficient support for the conclusion of a number of useful new agreements, whatever the PRC's attitude.



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#### IV. Institutional Arrangements


#### A. PRC and ROC Adherence to Conventions

1. <u>US Objectives</u>. (a) Encourage PRC adherence to multilateral agreements while (b) minimizing damage to the ROC's international position.

(This section does not go into the question of whether and how hard to press for allowing the ROC to accede to international agreements and treaties; that is a function of evolving US/ROC relations which are the subject of a separate study. We deal here with the problems raised by trying to meet the above objectives simultaneously.)

- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. PRC entry into the international community should lead to its more active participation in multilateral agreements. It will wish to obtain maximum advantage from the UNGA's recent Chirep action, and will seek to undermine the ROC's international position wherever possible.
- a. Existing Multilateral Agreements -- There will be questions as to whether the PRC or the ROC or both are parties to existing agreements. The PRC has so far taken a case-by-case approach in signifying by what agreements it considers itself bound where the ROC had adhered prior to establishment of the PRC. In all probability the PRC will not consider itself bound by ROC accessions after the establishment of the PRC. As for the ROC, we assume that in many cases it will wish to consider itself a party to agreements even though it was ejected from the UN.

The UN Secretariat recently rebuffed an ROC attempt to deposit instruments of ratification or accession for four agreements, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Secretariat (and UN Legal Counsel)




is taking the position that the ROC is not a state, and this view would no doubt be supported were it appealed to the General Assembly.

Where the US or another state friendly to the ROC is sole depositary, or where the US is one of the depositaries under the important multilateral agreements with "all states"/triple depositary clauses to which the ROC has not yet become a party (e.g. seabed arms control treaty, astronaut agreement, hijacking and aviation sabotage), the ROC would be able to deposit instruments of ratification or accession in Washington.

b. Future Multilateral Agreements -- Given the widespread desire for PRC participation, we must assume that it will be difficult if not impossible to ensure the ROC's right to participate in the negotiation of such agreements if they are under UN auspices -- even if the Vienna formula is used for invitations and the ROC is able to maintain its participation in one or more of the specialized agencies. (Negotiations outside of the UN framework would raise separate considerations. There might be a greater chance of assisting the ROC's participation in such negotiations.)

We also must assume that where the Secretariat is depositary the ROC will be rebuffed if it later seeks to accede to new multilateral agreements. The critical problem we face in this regard is to determine whether to continue with the Vienna formula for accessions, press for some other formula, or accept the Vienna formula for certain agreements (such as organization-type agreements) and press for another formula for agreements where a wider participation is desirable. The principal

<sup>\*</sup>The US is depositary to the 1944 Chicago ICAO Convention, to which the ROC has become a party but the recent action by the ICAO Council expelling the ROC from the Organization will raise questions about the ROC's status under the Convention.



considerations in this regard will include: desirability of PRC accession; implications for the ROC; acceptability to the FRG; and our own desire to prevent dissident groups and self-styled governments (e.g. Sihanouk and PRG) from acceding to agreements.

#### 3. Alternative Courses of Action.

#### a. Existing Multilateral Agreements --

i. With respect to the PRC. Encourage PRC participation when we determine that some of these are of such special interest as to merit our taking an active role. (Examples: 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Hijacking Convention.)

#### ii. With respect to the ROC.

- -- As regards "Vienna formula" Agreements
  (accession by any state member of UN or of any specialized agency) to which the ROC has already become a party, there seems little we can do to help the ROC. The UN Secretariat will probably no longer send them notifications of accessions, but the parties to each agreement, not the depositary, determine whether they continue to be bound vis-a-vis the ROC.
- -- As regards "Vienna formula" agreements to which the ROC has not yet become a party we have several alternatives, ranging from non-involvement to active support of ROC adherence (so long as it remains in any of the specialized agencies). The advantage of supporting ROC adherence is that this would make the treaty more universal -- which in some cases is very desirable -- and the effort would demonstrate US support for the ROC. Against this must be weighed disadvantages of possible harm to US-PRC relations, the




unlikelihood of success, and fueling attempts to drive the ROC from the agencies to which it still belongs.

-- As regards "all states/triple depositary" agreements to which the ROC has not yet become a party, the USG as one of the depositaries would be in a position to ensure the ROC's right to become a party.

#### b. Future Multilateral Agreements --

We would have a range of alternatives to consider:

- i. "Vienna Formula". If the UN Secretariat were depositary, this approach would include the PRC, exclude the GDR (at least for the time being), and while technically including the ROC. probably exclude it in practice even if it retained membership in a specialized agency. One variant of this approach might be to use as depositary (in place of the UN) a friendly State that is willing to accept both PRC and ROC, but not GDR accessions. However, this would probably be objectionable to both the PRC and the USSR. Another variant would be the use of the Vienna formula with triple depositaries. As noted above there is precedent for the use of triple depositaries but this, too, may be expected to meet with PRC and USSR objections.
- ii. All States/Triple (or Quadruple) Depositary Formula. The triple depositary approach would enable the PRC to accede at two depositary capitals (Moscow and London) and the ROC to accede at Washington. The PRC and its supporters would undoubtedly protest the ROC accession and accuse the US of implied recognition of the ROC



as a separate state. Moreover, the PRC may well insist on being a depositary, so that it would be in a position to help its "friends" (e.g. the RGNU) accede. Either of these multiple depositary formulas would permit the GDR to assert a right of accession, and this could seriously trouble the FRG at the present time, particularly in the case of any agreements providing for new international organizations. In view of the strong international support for the "Vienna formula", many other states may resist generalized use of any "all states" formula with multiple depositaries. However, the use of multiple depositaries may still be acceptable for those few non-organization type agreements where universal application is desired, as was the case with previous agreements where triple depositary clauses were used.

- iii. Simple "All States" Formula with a Sole Depositary. This approach includes the PRC but may give the FRG serious concern, at least for the time being. It would almost certainly exclude the ROC if the depositary is the UN Secretariat, but could include the ROC if a friendly state is depositary.
- iv. Seek New Formula Combining "Vienna Formula" with Clause Permitting Accession by Generally Unrecognized Entities. Such a formula would accomplish the same purpose as the "all states"/ triple depositary formula, while meeting the objection of some states to "Big Three" depositaries. However, the PRC may still be expected to oppose since it could be interpreted as giving status to the ROC. The FRG may also object that it enhances to some degree at least the position of the GDR. The FRG and the PRC would almost certainly object to use of the formula in the case of organizational type

agreements, and the formula would in fact present practical difficulties in the case of organizational type agreements.

The decision on which alternative to adopt will depend on policy determinations resulting from a separate study on the evolving US/ROC relationship.

#### B. UN Finances

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Obtain PRC assistance in resolving the steadily worsening budgetary situation in the United Nations by controlling the growth rate of the UN budget, introducing modern managerial practices into the Secretariat, and transferring technical assistance programs from the UN budget to the various voluntary funds created for this purpose.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. In considering its own attitudes on financial problems, the PRC has to take into account these factors: On the one hand, China is the sixth largest contributor (after the US, USSR, France, the UK, and Japan) to the UN budget, thus bearing a significant share of the financial burden. Given the spartan mores of the Chinese Communists, they might conceivably parallel many US attitudes on matters pertaining to the budget level and managerial problems. On the other hand, in their role as champion of the Third World they may choose to fight to retain, and possibly enlarge, the technical assistance programs contained in the regular budget. In that case, the less responsible elements in the United Nations will have acquired a powerful ally, and the PRC a vote-heavy constituency.

Assessment: The admission of the PRC should have no effect on the Chinese assessment rate, set at 4 percent for the period 1971-1973, since the ROC has always been assessed as the representative of all of China including

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the mainland. The PRC might ask the Committee on Contributions to review the Chinese assessment rate in the light of the more authoritative economic statistics which it will be required to submit to the Committee as a consequence of its membership.

Arrearages: As of June 30, 1971, the ROC was in arrears on the following accounts:

In addition the <u>net</u> assessment due from the ROC for the 1971 budget was \$6,272,971. Thus, past arrearages plus the unpaid 1971 assessment of the ROC amount to \$30,169,294. It is highly unlikely that the PRC will pay the \$23.9 million in past arrearages; whether they will pay all or part of the 1971 assessment remains to be seen. If they refuse, the total of "uncollectible" arrearages, i.e., payments deliberately withheld by members, will rise by that amount.

In all probability, the PRC will join France, the USSR, and the other East Europeans in refusing to pay for certain peacekeeping-related items in the regular budget. In the case of China, this would amount to an annual withholding of about \$350,000 at present rates.

Other Costs: The major additional cost to the UN would be the introduction of Chinese as a working language in all UN forums. UN Secretariat sources estimate the cost would be in the neighborhood of \$5 million, an estimate based on the present cost of Russian language services in the UN.

3. Alternative Courses of Action. If the PRC evinces attitudes parallel to our own on budget control and administrative reforms, we should consider inviting it and Japan to join the Big Four group (US, USSR, UK,


and France) in New York, which in recent years has met informally to discuss UN budgetary and administrative problems, and coordinate approaches on these problems to the Secretary General. Together the six would account for 69.4 percent of the UN regular budget. We should realize that the PRC may refuse to join such consultations, on the ground that they constitute yet another mode of big power dominance of the UN, to which they are opposed in principle.

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If the PRC opts for a less responsible stance on finances, our problems in the UN would doubtless be exacerbated, but it might -- just possibly -- serve to make the Soviets more amenable to cooperation with the US on matters of mutual interest. In any event, we should still consider inviting Japan, the greatest economic power and source of development assistance in Asia, to join the Big Four as a counterweight to Chinese influence in the General Assembly.

#### C. Secretary General

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Convince the PRC that it is in our mutual interests to elect a Secretary General with outstanding qualifications as a statesman and managerial talent to cope with the UN's substantial administrative and financial problems. Max Jakobson (Finland) is our preferred candidate.
- 2. PRC Attitude and Attendant Problems. The PRC has reportedly said that it is not prepared to make any commitment now in this regard. It has veto power in the selection of a SYG. If reports that the PRC finds Jakobson acceptable prove true, this would measurably improve his chances. If not, the race is likely to become wide open.



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
3. Suggested Action. We have no alternative but to consult with the PRC in the process of seeking a consensus among the permanent members on a new SYG.


#### D. PRC Personnel in UN and Specialized Agencies

- 1. <u>US Objectives</u>. Ensure that PRC entry to the UN does not result in an unreasonable loss of senior key posts to the US and does not place PRC nationals in positions of excessive influence in a sensitive area. Try to have their claims to high level posts in the UN satisfied at the expense of the USSR or EE countries rather than of the US.
- 2. PRC Attitudes and Attendant Problems. As a major power and permanent member of the Security Council the PRC will doubtless claim an Under Secretary General, an Assistant Secretary General and several D-2 (senior career grade) posts. They are not likely to seek any large-scale appointments of their nationals, first because they probably do not dispose of many well qualified candidates and second because they will trust only their senior people to live in the US as UN employees.

#### 3. Alternative Courses of Action

A game of musical chairs will take place following the appointment of a new Secretary General. Our efforts to promote the appointment of a Secretary General whose views on personnel are at least tolerable to us may be complicated if the PRC rules out a European. In the UN our attachment to the Under Secretary's position occupied by Ralph Bunche has been questioned in view of the stalemate on peacekeeping, but this could change with a new SYG. The Bunche position (Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs) is important or unimportant according to what the incumbent, the Secretary





General and the member states make of it. We thus believe that given the right candidate, the US should continue to claim the Bunche position. Other alternatives for us are Under Secretary for Economic and Social Development, Under Secretary for Administration, or even the Legal Counsel.

If we should decide to forego the Bunche position we should see that it is not offered to the PRC since we cannot exclude the possibility that the PRC would exploit this key job. Since one very senior UK official (Mathews) will be leaving, it would be an act of career recognition, a compensatory step and a precautionary measure if the new SYG promoted another Briton, Brian Urquhart, Bunche's deputy, to succeed Bunche. If this were to happen, the position of Jiri Nosek (Czech), Under Secretary for Conference Services, which will become vacant in March 1972, would be an innocuous high-level post for the PRC. As a less desirable alternative, Stavropoulos' responsibility for General Assembly Affairs might be consolidated with the Victor Lessiovski (USSR) job of Special Assistant to the Secretary General and offered to the This would give PRC access to the 38th floor without very much substantive authority or influence. (Lessiovski has said he plans to return to the USSR after the General Assembly.)

Victor Hoo (China) will leave the post of Commissioner for Technical Cooperation. It would be desirable to deny this potentially important job to the PRC. U Nyum (Burma) is expected to leave the post of Executive Secretary of ECAFE, a post the PRC may seek. If Narasimhan (India) is displaced in New York he might wish to take that position again. Otherwise, it would seem desirable to surface a non-PRC candidate, for we should attempt to deny the U Nyum position to the PRC unless it displays an unexpected interest in regional economic cooperation.

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In the Specialized Agencies the PRC pattern will probably follow that in the UN -- seek a few senior, key posts and expand as they gain experience.

